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§ 27.01 Introduction* **
Joint operations are the norm in oil and gas ventures around the world.
Oil and gas exploration and development are expensive and highly risky,
so investors seek to minimize individual risks by sharing them with others.
Further, in the United States, leases covering a production area are likely
to be held by several owners because mineral titles have been fragmented
historically. For these reasons, it is common to see dozens of working interest owners in a single well in this country.
Joint operations are usually conducted under the terms of an operating
agreement, a written contract between cotenants or separate owners of oil
and gas interests setting out their agreement to operate their interests or
leases as one “contract area.” Practicality is one reason to use an operating
agreement. The common law defining the rights and obligations of the
owners of working interests in oil and gas operations is complicated, confusing, and incomplete. Sometimes the law of cotenancy applies, but often
it does not.1 And when the law of cotenancy applies, its hoary principles
may not “fit” the modern oil and gas industry.
Furthermore, there are other important reasons for operating agreements, including limited liability and taxation. No investor wants to be
jointly and severally liable for the torts and contracts of other co-investors.
Structuring a venture as a corporation brings limited liability but subjects
it to double taxation and may limit its ability to take advantage of tax
* Cite as John S. Lowe, “Some Recurring Issues in Operating Agreements and What
AAPL’s Drafting Committee Might Do About Them,” 60 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 27-1 (2014).
** I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Richard Booth; Tim Dowd; John Grace; Lynn
Hendrix; Douglas Mills; Professor David Percy; my research assistant, Daniel C. Lunsford;
my former students Ryan Johnson, James Murphy, Patrick Murphy, Randy Parcel, and R.J.
Pathroff for their research and analysis, as well as Donna Gaubert, my SMU administrative
assistant; and Margo MacDonnell and the Foundation staff for their editorial assistance.
The opinions I express are my own, and do not reflect the opinions of Southern Methodist
University, SMU’s Dedman School of Law, or the Hutchison Endowment.
1 If working interest owners own undivided interests in the same lease(s), they are cotenants. But if they own interests in different leases, they are not cotenants, even if the leases
are in the same spacing unit. See Come Big or Stay Home, LLC v. EOG Res., Inc., 2012 ND
91, ¶ 19, 816 N.W.2d 80, 87.
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losses.2 Partnerships are ideal entities for oil and gas development for tax
purposes since profits and losses flow through to the partners. But partners
have fiduciary obligations to one another, and from a liability viewpoint,
partnership is a disaster because partners are jointly and severally liable.3
Additionally, partnership interests are difficult to convey and relatively
unmarketable.
Concurrent ownership is traditionally the favored structure for oil and
gas operations, and it is facilitated by an operating agreement. Under the
operating agreement, each party owns separate property for tax purposes,
and the tax results are approximately the same as they are for partners.
But the liabilities of the non-operating parties are effectively limited to the
amount of their investments. The operator is an independent contractor,
liable for its own torts and contractual obligations, not a partner of the
non-operators.4
Effectively, an operating agreement “pools” leases and fractional interests
in leases or mineral rights within the defined contract area under the dayto-day direction of an individual or corporation designated as the “operator.” This brings additional expertise to the venture and spreads the risks
of drilling and the cost of operations.5 An operating agreement provides
a decision-making process, a risk-allocation mechanism, and a financial
instrument for the parties involved in exploration and production operations within the contract area.6

2 See Charles O. Galvin, “The ‘Ought’ and ‘Is’ of Oil-and-Gas Taxation,” 73 Harv. L. Rev.
1441, 1495–96 (1960).
3 See Howard L. Boigon & Christine L. Murphy, “Liabilities of Nonoperating Mineral
Interest Owners,” 51 U. Colo. L. Rev. 153, 157 (1980) (citing Dana v. Searight, 47 F.2d 38
(10th Cir. 1931); Riss v. Harvey, 354 P.2d 594 (Colo. 1960); Mikel Drilling Co. v. Dunkin,
1957 OK 226, 318 P.2d 435).
4 While operating agreements are popularly referred to as “joint operating agreements”
or “JOAs,” they are structured to avoid classification as partnerships. See id. at 161 (“It is
well settled that one co-tenant cannot do anything with respect to the common property
binding upon his co-tenants unless they may have authorized or ratified his act. No agency
by implication arises out of his act merely from the relationship of co-tenancy.” (quoting
Tungsten Prods., Inc. v. Kimmel, 105 P.2d 822, 823–24 (Wash. 1940))). See also Taylor v.
Brindley, 164 F.2d 235, 240 (10th Cir. 1947); Myers v. Crenshaw, 116 S.W.2d 1125, 1129
(Tex. Civ. App. 1938), aff ’d, 137 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1940)).
5 See Alexander J. Black & Hew R. Dundas, “Joint Operating Agreements: An International Comparison from Petroleum Law,” 8 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 49, 49–50 (1992).
6 See David E. Pierce, “Transactional Evolution of Operating Agreements in the Oil
and Gas Industry,” Oil and Gas Agreements: Joint Operations 1-1, 1-10 (Rocky Mt. Min. L.
Fdn. 2008).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2805612

27-4

Mineral Law Institute

§ 27.01

Operating agreements are ubiquitous in the American oil and gas industry. There are nearly one million producing wells in the United States,7
most of which are subject to at least one operating agreement. Historically,
oil companies developed their own operating agreement forms, which
they then exchanged and negotiated over—sometimes not reaching agreement before the property in question stopped producing.8 The inherent
inefficiency of reinventing the wheel for every drilling venture led to the
development of the first American Association of Professional Landmen
(AAPL) Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement in 1956 (AAPL
Form 610-1956).9 Revised forms followed in 1977, 1982, and 1989.10 The
AAPL model forms have become the standard in the United States, and
will be the focus of this chapter.
Interest owners may use a model form as their governing contract or,
less frequently, as a tool to start the negotiating process to draft their own

7 In 2009, there were 824,847 producing oil and gas wells in the United States, as compared to about 3,650 in Saudi Arabia. It has been estimated that more than 45,000 new wells
will be drilled in the United States each year. Since 1950, 2.6 million wells have been drilled
in the United States. See Webcast, World Oil, “Oil and Gas Forecast 2013” (Feb. 19, 2013).
8 This author was once involved as an expert witness in a dispute in which an entire
field was developed, produced, plugged, and abandoned, apparently without the parties
ever agreeing on the terms of an operating agreement. See George W. Hazlett, “Drafting
of Joint Operating Agreements,” 3 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 277, 277–78 (1957) (noting that
joint operations were so frequent that almost every company developed its own form of
agreement to state the rights and obligations of the participants, but these agreements were
not uniform and the desire of each company to use its own form often created disputes that
resulted in costly delay and animosity).
9 The process of the development of the AAPL Form 610-1956, which was originally
published as the “Ross-Martin” Model Form by Kraftbilt, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, is discussed
at J. O. Young, “Oil and Gas Operating Agreements: Producers 88 Operating Agreements,
Selected Problems and Suggested Solutions,” 20 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 197, 198–202 (1975).
See also John R. Reeves & J. Matthew Thompson, “The Development of the Model Form
Operating Agreement: An Interpretative Accounting,” 54 Okla. L. Rev. 211, 214–16 (2001).
As noted below at note 23, however, the first organizationally generated model form was the
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation’s (RMMLF) Rocky Mountain Unit Operating
Agreement, Form 1 (Undivided Interest) (RMMLF Form 1), which was published by the
Foundation in May 1954.
10 There have also been occasional tweaks to the forms. In 1967, the AAPL Form 6101956 received cosmetic changes, primarily to reflect that it had been endorsed by the American Association of Petroleum Landmen (now the American Association of Professional
Landmen), and was no longer a “pure” commercial form. And in 2013, the 1989 model
form was revised to include horizontal modifications. See Jeff Weems, “Changes Within the
AAPL 610 - 1989 Model Form Operating Agreement: Horizontal Modifications and Other
Developments,” 59 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 29-1 (2013).

§ 27.01

Operating Agreements

27-5

operating agreement.11 Parties to onshore oil and gas ventures in the
United States almost always tailor one of the AAPL model forms;12 relatively minor change is the norm, though all of the AAPL model forms provide space for additional provisions, which may be lengthy.13 Offshore in
the United States, the parties typically use one of the AAPL forms designed
for offshore use; there are two, one adopted in 2002 for Outer Continental
Shelf use14 and an offshore deepwater version adopted in 2007.15
There are several justifications for the development and use of model
forms. They provide parties with well-written and comprehensive agreements that reflect industry best practices, reduce negotiation and drafting
expenses, and allow for efficient interpretation of agreements by developing interpretative precedents over time.16 But the fact remains that operating agreements are second only to leases as litigation generators.17 They are
also second only to leases in the amount of commentary that they attract
at meetings like this one.18

11 Michael D. Josephson, “Fundamentals of International Joint Operating Agreements,”
53 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. 17-1, 17-3 (Ctr. for Am. & Int’l L. 2002).
12 While new drilling ventures in the United States generally use the AAPL Form 6101989, it is common to see the older forms in use in areas where they were used during
initial exploration and operations, in the interest of uniformity. Some small operators just
use the forms that they have become accustomed to using, and some larger companies have
refused to use the AAPL Form 610-1989, viewing it as insufficiently operator friendly. See
Lynn P. Hendrix, “The New Model Operating Agreement Forms: Why Change the Rules
in the Ninth Inning?” Onshore Pooling and Unitization 6-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1997).
13 See AAPL Form 610-1956, at art. 30; AAPL Form 610-1977, at art. XV; AAPL Form
610-1982, at art. XV; AAPL Form 610-1989, at art. XVI.
14 AAPL Form 710-2002 Model Form Offshore Operating Agreement (2002 AAPL
Offshore JOA).
15 AAPL Form 810-2007 Model Form Deepwater Operating Agreement (2007 AAPL
Deepwater JOA).
16 See Andrew B. Derman & Isabel Amadeo, “The 1989 AAPL Model Form Operating
Agreement—Why Are You Not Using It?” Oil & Gas Agreements: Joint Operations 16-1,
16-2 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2008). See also A. Timothy Martin & J. Jay Park, “Global
Petroleum Industry Model Contracts Revisited: Higher, Faster, Stronger,” 3 J. World Energy
L. & Bus. 4, 8 (2010).
17 The frequency of litigation reflects that the model forms are drafted by committees,
whose members often disagree and ultimately compromise and move on, leaving language
that may be unclear; that parties sometimes substantially and inartfully modify the terms of
the model agreements; that “models” do not necessarily fit the circumstances in which they
are used; and that there is lots of money at stake.
18 A search of the Foundation’s Digital Library alone found more than 100 papers with
“Operating” or “Operator” in the title.
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The AAPL has begun the process of revising the AAPL Form 610-1989
Model Form Operating Agreement (AAPL Form 610-1989),19 and over
the next couple of years everyone active in the industry likely will find
themselves discussing what the drafting committee proposes or what the
drafting committee ought to do. This chapter will consider some issues
that commonly arise with operating agreements and suggest to the drafting committee some changes that they might consider. In particular, this
chapter will focus on what we can learn from others, looking at some of
the provisions in the Association of International Petroleum Negotiators
(AIPN) 2012 Model International JOA (AIPN 2012 JOA),20 the Canadian
Association of Petroleum Landmen (CAPL) 2007 Operating Procedure
(CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure),21 the Australian Mining and Petroleum Law Association (AMPLA) Model Petroleum Joint Operating Agreement (AMPLA 2011 JOA),22 the United Kingdom Offshore Operators
Association (UKOOA) Model Form JOA (UKOOA 2009 JOA), and the
model forms issued by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation.23
19 The committee includes Fred MacDonald, Bob Duplantis, Jeff Weems, Mike Curry,
Tom Daily, Dorsey Roach, Andy Rudderow, Worth Carlin, Dave Padgett, Jim Dewbre, and
Dora Soria. See Worth Carlin & Jeff Weems, “Changes Within the AAPL 610 - 1989 Model
Form Operating Agreement: Horizontal Modifications and Other Developments,” Development Issues in Major Shale Plays: What’s on the Horizon? 5-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2014).
20 AIPN

endorsed model forms in 1990, 1995, 2002, and 2012.

21 In Canada, one typically sees one of the five model form operating procedures developed by the CAPL and issued in 1971, 1974, 1982, 1990, and 2007. See Douglas G. Mills,
Carolyn A. Wright & Julie J.M. Inch, “Exploring the Balance of Power in the Operator/NonOperator Relationship Under the CAPL Operating Procedure,” 48 Alta. L. Rev. 363 (2010).
22 In Australia, one typically sees either one of the AIPN forms or the model form
published by AMPLA in 2011. See AMPLA Model Petroleum Joint Operating Agreement,
Approved Version 1 (Dec. 9, 2011) (AMPLA 2011 JOA). See also John Grace, “The AMPLA
Model Petroleum Joint Operating Agreement,” AMPLA Yearbook 204 (2011) (discussion of
AMPLA 2011 JOA by its drafter).
23 There are three model form operating agreements published by the Foundation.
RMMLF Form 1, the first organizationally generated model form, was issued by the Foundation in May 1954, predating Kraftbilt’s Form 610 by more than a year. RMMLF Form
1 was designed for use with undivided interests, i.e., where the parties to the agreement
jointly owned interests in the same leases. It is not often used today. See Hendrix, supra note
12, at 6-4 to 6-5. In the Rocky Mountain area, where federal lands are involved, it is common to see the Foundation’s Rocky Mountain Unit Operating Agreement, Form 2 (Divided
Interest) (RMMLF Form 2), which was published by the Foundation in 1980 and revised in
1985 and 1994. RMMLF Form 2 is designed for use with divided interests, i.e., where the
parties to the agreement own interests in different leases subjected to the unit:

Under the [RMMLF] Form 2 the working interest owners participate in costs
and production on the basis of “participating areas” (smaller areas within the
unit approximating the area capable of producing unitized substances in paying
quantities), in proportion to the committed acreage each owns in the participating areas. While participation is based upon acreage within participating areas,
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This chapter will also examine the more recent AAPL drafting ventures for
offshore operations, which the AAPL drafting committee might consider
to address the recurring issues that will be discussed.24 Due to time and
space limitations, the focus will be on issues related to operators—particularly operator liability and operator removal.
There is a sharp contrast between the theory and the practice of being an
operator. In theory, the operator serves as an accommodation to the nonoperators, who are not the operator’s partners, but lease or mineral-estate
cotenants or separate lease owners working together under a contractual
cotenancy created by the operating agreement. The basic scheme of operating agreements around the world is that the operator will be one of the
working interest owners. Generally, the operator is either a large working interest owner or one that has equipment and personnel conveniently
located to the property that serves the group of owners in the interest of
efficiency, rather than to make a profit from charging fees for acting as
operator.25 The operator is not directly compensated for being the operator. The concept is that the operator will make its profits from its ownership of mineral rights and the sale of its percentage of production, just like
the non-operators, rather than from fees paid by its co-owners.
In practice, being an operator brings with it many advantages that may
translate to profit. The operator can keep its equipment gainfully employed
and its employees maintaining and upgrading their skills, while obtaining
financial and perhaps technical support from non-operators. Overhead
rates provided for in the Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies, Inc.
(COPAS) accounting procedures are often generous.26 Most importantly,
the participating areas can expand or contract and each participant’s share of
costs and production in wells within a participating area can change based upon
a number of factors, including the drilling of additional wells. This concept
makes divided type units unique and some of the most complicated agreements
in the oil and gas industry. The [RMMLF] Form 2 is the most widely used operating agreement for federal exploratory units.
Hendrix, supra note 12, at 6-5. The Foundation also publishes the Rocky Mountain Joint
Operating Agreement, Form 3 (RMMLF Form 3), originally published in 1959 and again
in 1968, which has largely been supplanted by versions of the AAPL model form. See id.
24 See

2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA; 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA.

25 Where the transaction is structured so that the operator makes a profit from being the
operator, as are many investments sold from “boiler room” operations in the United States,
investors and their lawyers may see these limitations as inappropriate. See John S. Lowe, Oil
and Gas Law in a Nutshell 420 (6th ed. 2014).
26 See Robert C. Bledsoe, “Current Problems Between Operators and Nonoperators in
Operating Agreements,” 40 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax’n 8-1, 8-4 (Sw. Legal Fdn. 1989)
(“The operator often has a substantial financial stake in remaining as operator, not to mention his pride.”).
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being an operator brings with it the ability to shape the overall operational
plan and to control outright day-to-day operations, both of which provide
protections to the operator’s investment that the non-operators do not
have.27 Often, the question of who gets to be the operator is one of the most
hotly debated issues as parties negotiate operating agreements.28
But the freewheeling “wildcatting” culture of the North American oil
and gas industry often leads an operator, once ensconced, to act as a virtual
dictator, proposing and conducting operations with little or no consultation with non-operators.29 Disputes between operators and non-operators
are frequent. Operator liability and operator removal are recurring topics
explored in this chapter.

§ 27.02 Operator Liability—Should an Operator Be Liable for
Breach of the JOA in the Absence of Gross Negligence
or Willful Misconduct?
The model form operating agreements make it hard for non-operators
to recover damages from the operator. Exculpatory language in the model
forms severely limits the ability of non-operators to hold the operator
liable. The operator acts for the non-operators subject to a “good and
workmanlike” standard, but it is liable for its actions as operator only
where it is guilty of “gross negligence or willful misconduct.” The apparent contradiction in terms in fact makes perfect sense in the industry: the
operator serves as an accommodation to the non-operators, rather than as
a for-hire independent contractor or employee.30 Since the operator is not
27 P. Sean Murphy & Jonathan Sutcliffe, “The Operator’s Limitation of Liability Under
the 1995 AIPN Model Form International Operating Agreement—Have We Gone Too
Far?” Landman 1, 9 (May/June 2002). Murphy and Sutcliffe were discussing one of the
AIPN forms, but the principle applies to all operating agreements; “It’s good to be king,” as
Mel Brooks said in the movie, History of the World, Part I.
28 The party to the agreement with the largest production interest is often the operator.
It is usually considered imperative by the parties to an operating agreement that the operator have a substantial production interest in the contract area. See Michael D. Josephson,
“How Far Does the CAPL Travel? A Comparative Overview of the CAPL Model Form
Operating Procedure and the AIPN Model Form International Operating Agreement,” 41
Alta. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2003). It is often said that investors want the operator to have “skin in the
game.”
29 Non-operators have limited duties under the JOA, the most important duty being providing funds to the operator. See Nkaepe Etteh, “Joint Operating Agreements: Which Issues
are Likely to Be the Most Sensitive to the Parties and How Can a Good Contract Design
Limit the Damage from Such Disputes?” at 4 (Univ. of Dundee Ctr. for Energy, Petroleum
& Mineral L. & Pol’y 2010) (unpublished).
30 The AIPN 2012 JOA states that explicitly: the operator shall “neither gain a profit
nor suffer a loss as a result of being the Operator . . . .” AIPN 2012 JOA, at art. 4.2.B.5. The
AMPLA 2011 JOA and CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure have similar language at clause
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paid directly for its services, it should be liable for its mistakes and failures
only where they are gross or willful.
But the scope of the exculpatory language is an issue: does the “gross negligence or willful misconduct” limitation on liability apply to all breaches
of the JOA?

[1] Provisions of the AAPL Model Forms
The issue developed in the context of changes in the AAPL model form.
Article 5 of the AAPL Form 610-1956 provided that the operator
shall conduct and direct and have full control of all operations on the Unit Area
as permitted and required by, and within the limits of, this agreement. It shall
conduct all such operations in a good and workmanlike manner, but it shall
have no liability as Operator to the other parties for losses sustained, or liabilities
incurred, except such as may result from gross negligence or from breach of the
provisions of this agreement.31

The language quoted plainly tied the liability limitation to lease operations
and plainly permitted non-operators to recover damages for breach of the
terms of the operating agreement.32 But in the 1977 and 1982 AAPL model
form revisions, the language of the second sentence was changed to

6.3(c) and clause 5.2, respectively. The drafting committee should consider adding such
language to the new AAPL model form, or perhaps drafting alternative provisions: one
adopting the “no profit” position, and another stating forthrightly that the operator expects
to make a profit from fees for providing services.
31 AAPL Form 610-1956, at art. V (emphasis added). The exculpatory language of the
other early model form, RMMLF Form 1, was not so plainly stated. It provided that the “Unit
Operator shall not be liable to any other Party for anything done or omitted to be done by
it in the conduct of operations hereunder except in case of bad faith,” thus interjecting the
issue of the operator’s subjective state of mind. RMMLF Form 1, at art. 8.3. Similar language
was in article 4.5 of RMMLF Form 3 and in the AIPN 1990 JOA, which defined “gross negligence” to exclude “any error of judgment or mistake made . . . in the exercise in good faith
of any function, authority or discretion conferred . . . under this Agreement.” AIPN 1990
JOA, at art. 1.36. Subsequent AIPN versions dropped the reference, but it is maintained in
the definitions of the UKOOA 2009 JOA in the event of “special circumstances”:

“Wilful Misconduct” means an intentional or reckless disregard by Senior Managerial Personnel of Good Oilfield Practice or any of the terms of this Agreement
in utter disregard of avoidable and harmful consequences but shall not include
any act, omission, error of judgment or mistake made in the exercise in good faith
of any function, authority or discretion vested in or exercisable by such Senior
Managerial Personnel and which in the exercise of such good faith is justifiable by
special circumstances, including safeguarding of life, property or the environment
and other emergencies.
UKOOA 2009 JOA, at cl. 1.1 (emphasis added).
32 See, e.g., Lancaster v. Petroleum Corp. of Del., 491 So. 2d 768 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (an
operator who resigned without giving the 90 days’ notice required by article 21 was held
liable for loss of a non-operator’s interest).
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[Operator] shall conduct all such operations in a good and workmanlike manner,
but it shall have no liability as Operator to the other parties for losses sustained
or liabilities incurred, except such as may result from gross negligence or willful
misconduct.33

The drafters added “willful misconduct” and omitted “or from breach of
the provisions of this agreement.”
Professor Ernest Smith argued that the intent of the language change was
to expand the exculpatory language so that it applied to any cause of action
that a non-operator might assert, whether for tortious conduct or a breach
of contract.34 Though a federal court applying Texas law held in Stine v.
Marathon Oil Co.35 that the changed exculpatory language was to be interpreted very broadly,36 several courts, relying in part upon the analysis of
Professor Gary Conine,37 have held that the changes in fact limited the
exculpatory language to non-operators’ claims relating to the conduct of
operations; it is not necessary for a non-operator alleging that the operator
has breached the operating agreement to show gross negligence or willful misconduct.38 By this line of cases, referred to here as the “Abraxus
line,” the exculpatory language applies only to the conduct of operations or
breaches of express or implied obligations that relate to operations.
33 AAPL

Form 610-1977, at art. V.A; AAPL Form 610-1982, at art. V.A.

34 Ernest E. Smith, “Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to Nonoperators,
Investors, and Other Interest Owners,” 32 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 12-1, 12-30 (1986).
35 976

F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992).

36 The

court in Stine reasoned that:

The tenor of the wording of the exculpatory clause is that Marathon [the
operator] is not liable for good faith performance of “duties under this agreement” . . . . Thus, in the present case, Marathon is not liable for any action taken
in connection with the completion, testing or turnover, or any well drilled under
the provisions of the JOA unless Stine [the non-operator] can prove that Marathon’s actions were grossly negligent or willful. This protection extends to Marathon’s various administrative and accounting duties, including the recovery of
costs under the authority of the JOA.
It is clear to us that the protection of the exculpatory clause extends not only
to “acts unique to the operator,” as the district court expressed it, but also to any
acts done under the authority of the JOA “as Operator.” This protection clearly
extends to breaches of the JOA.
Id. at 261 (citations omitted).
37 See Gary B. Conine, “The Prudent Operator Standard: Applications beyond the Oil
and Gas Lease,” 41 Nat. Res. J. 23, 66–74 (2001).
38 See Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000,
no pet.); Cone v. Fagadau Energy Corp., 68 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, pet.
denied); IP Petroleum Co. v. Wevanco Energy, L.L.C., 116 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship v. Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267
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The AAPL Form 610-1989, which predated all of the cases that applied
the “gross negligence or willful misconduct” limitation narrowly, appeared
to move back toward the broad Stine interpretation, providing that:
Operator shall conduct its activities under this agreement as a reasonable prudent
operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, with due diligence and dispatch,
in accordance with good oilfield practice, and in compliance with applicable law
and regulations, but in no event shall it have any liability as Operator to the other
parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred except such as may result from
gross negligence or willful misconduct.39

That language was interpreted expansively by the Texas Supreme Court
in Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC.40 There, non-operators claimed
damages because their operator had failed to maintain production in paying quantities, causing valuable leases to terminate and the Texas Railroad
Commission to dissolve the unit and suspend operations. At trial, a jury
found the operator had breached his duty to the non-operators by failing to
maintain production in paying quantities and that the exculpatory clause
did not exempt the operator from liability because his conduct rose “to the
level of gross negligence or willful misconduct.”41 The court of appeals held
that the exculpatory clause could not have protected the operator from the
claims of the non-operators because it did not apply to breach-of-contract
claims.42
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court focused on the change of the language of the model forms.43 The supreme court noted that while the 1956,
1977, and 1982 model forms had linked the exculpatory language to the
operator’s obligation to “conduct all such operations in a good and workmanlike manner,”44 the 1989 form tied it to the operator’s duty to “conduct
its activities under this agreement as a reasonable prudent operator, in a
good and workmanlike manner, with due diligence and in accordance with
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, pet. denied); Shell Rocky Mountain Prod., LLC v. Ultra Res., Inc.,
415 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005). See also PYR Energy Corp. v. Samson Res. Co., 470 F. Supp.
2d 709 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (discussion of whether in a diversity case a federal district court
applying Texas law should follow Stine or the Abraxas line of cases in ruling on the scope of
the JOA’s exculpatory clause).
39 AAPL
40 395

Form 610-1989, at art. V.A (emphasis added).

S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2012).

41 Id.

at 790.

42 Id.

at 790–91.

43 Id.

at 794.

44 Id.

at 793 (emphasis added) (quoting Reeder v. Wood Cnty. Energy, LLC, 320 S.W.3d
433, 444 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2010)).
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good oilfield practice . . . .”45 Based upon the language differences—“its
activities under this agreement” rather than “all such operations”—and
noting that some commentators had concluded the AAPL Form 610-1989
provided for a broader exculpation of the operator, the Texas Supreme
Court held that the 1989 model form exculpatory language protected the
operator against liability for mere negligence not just in the conduct of
basic oilfield operations but arising out of its conduct of all activities under
the operating agreement.46
Where “gross negligence or willful misconduct” is the standard for an
operator’s liability, the bar for non-operators is high. “Gross negligence is
generally defined as the failure to use even slight care.”47 To prove gross
negligence, a non-operator must show much more than mere negligence.
The key aspect of gross negligence is the “conscious indifference” to a
known risk.48 There must be evidence that the operator had actual subjective knowledge of an extreme risk of serious harm and nonetheless proceeded to act.49 Also, there must be some extraordinary harm foreseeable,
not the type of harm ordinarily associated with breaches of contract or
even with bad-faith denials of contract rights; harm such as “death, grievous physical injury, or financial ruin” is necessary.50 Willful misconduct
is a similarly high standard; Texas courts have held that there is little

45 Id.

(emphasis added).

46 Id. at 794–95 (citing Robert C. Bledsoe, “The Operating Agreement: Matters Not
Covered or Inadequately Covered,” 47 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 15-1, 15-9 (2001); Wilson
Woods, Comment, “The Effect of Exculpatory Clauses in Joint Operating Agreements:
What Protections Do Operators Really Have in the Oil Patch?” 38 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 211,
214–15 (2005)). After finding that the operator had not acted with gross negligence or
willful misconduct, the Texas Supreme Court reversed and ruled in favor of the operator.
Id. at 797.
47 Andrew B. Derman, The New and Improved 1989 Joint Operating Agreement: A Working Manual 27 (1991).
48 Robert L. Theriot, “Disputes Between Operators and Non-Operators: Judicial Application of Joint Operating Agreements,” 30 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. L. Sec. Rep., No. 3, at 95
(State Bar of Tex. 2006) (citing Flye v. City of Waco, 50 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001,
no pet.)).
49 Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 22 (Tex. 1994), superseded by statute, 2003
Tex. Sess. L. Serv. ch. 204, § 13 (raised the standard to require clear and convincing evidence), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 140 (Tex. 2012).
50 879

S.W.2d at 24.
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distinction between it and gross negligence.51 If there is a distinction, it is
that willful misconduct may require a higher element of intent.52
In sum, an operator is grossly negligent if it either knowingly does
something contrary to good oilfield practice, realizing that its action could
result in extraordinary harm or financial ruin to the non-operators, or
refuses to act when it is so required by the JOA or other contracts and the
failure results in financial ruin to the non-operators’ property.53 An operator engages in willful misconduct if it acts or refuses to act with a specific
intent to harm the non-operators.
Whether the operator’s actions or inactions constitute gross negligence
is a question of fact. The court in IP Petroleum Co. v. Wevanco Energy,
L.L.C.54 required a finding of great misconduct, rather than a series of
errors. There, the operator had no written drilling plan for the well; failed
to use drilling mud so that the drill bit became stuck, adding more than
$100,000 to drilling costs; ran no drill-stem test on the well; did not inform
the non-operators that setting pipe would prevent well deepening; and
permitted the farmout agreement under which it was operating to expire
while it was still engaged in drilling operations.55 The court said that these
failures were “legally sufficient evidence of negligence,” but did not “rise to
the level of gross negligence . . . .”56
Many think that the Reeder case goes too far, and that the drafting committee may move back to the language of the 1977 and 1982 agreements or
state plainly in the new AAPL form that the exculpatory language does not
apply to breaches of contract.57 But the divergence of the c ommentators
51 See IP Petroleum Co. v. Wevanco Energy, L.L.C., 116 S.W.3d 888, 898 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (citing Marshall Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
790 F. Supp. 1291 (E.D. Tex. 1992)).
52 See Jeanine Feriancek, “Operator Liability for Negligence?” 11 Nat. Resources & Env’t
58, 60 (1996).
53 Id.
54 116
55 Id.

S.W.3d 888 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

at 897–98.

56 Id.

at 898. But see Hamilton v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 323 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 1982) (holding that an operator might be held liable under the operating agreement for drilling a well at other than the agreed location without even giving notice to the
non-operator and stating that “[s]everal connected acts of simple negligence may support a
jury’s finding of gross negligence”).
57 See Carlin & Weems, supra note 19, at 5-50 (discussing recent JOA modifications
affecting horizontal drilling in shale plays, the speakers stated that the provision was currently being rewritten to distinguish “the standards of conduct from the limitations of
liability”).
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and the cases raises the question of how broad the operator’s liability limitation should be.

[2] Provisions of Other Model Forms
Other model forms give little guidance regarding any industry “norm”:
the scope of the liability exclusion apparently varies.
The AIPN 2012 JOA likely gives an operator protection broader than any
of the AAPL model forms. It begins with a release of liability for “performing (or failing to perform) the duties and functions of Operator,” including
liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct:
neither Operator nor any other Operator Indemnitee shall bear (except as a Party
to the extent of its Participating Interest share) any damage, loss, cost, or liability
resulting from performing (or failing to perform) the duties and functions of
Operator, and the Operator Indemnitees[58] are hereby released from liability
to Non-Operators for any and all damages, losses, costs, and liabilities arising
out of, incident to or resulting from such performance or failure to perform,
even though caused in whole or in part by a pre-existing defect, or the negligence
(whether sole, joint or concurrent), gross negligence, willful misconduct, strict
liability or other legal fault of Operator (or any other Operator Indemnitee).59

The AIPN 2012 JOA follows with an indemnification promise from the
non-operators that also extends to gross negligence and willful misconduct:
the Parties shall (in proportion to their Participating Interests) defend and indemnify Operator Indemnitees from any damages, losses, costs (including reasonable legal costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees), and liabilities incident to claims,
demands or causes of action brought by or for any person or entity, which claims,
demands or causes of action arise out of, are incident to or result from Joint
Operations, even though caused in whole or in part by a pre-existing defect, or
the negligence (whether sole, joint or concurrent), gross negligence, willful misconduct, strict liability or other legal fault of Operator (or any other Operator
Indemnitee).60

The AIPN 2012 JOA contains an option, however, which the parties usually choose, that extends the possibility of liability for gross negligence or
willful misconduct. But in comparison to the language of the AAPL model
forms, it only narrowly opens the window to operator liability:

58 “Operator Indemnitee” is defined as “any of the Operator, its Affiliates, or their
respective directors, officers, and employees. Operator Indemnitees means all of them.”
AIPN 2012 JOA, at art. 1.1.
59 Id.

at art. 4.6.A (emphasis added).

60 Id.

at art. 4.6.B (emphasis added).
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Despite Article 4.6.A or 4.6.B, if any Senior Supervisory Personnel[61] of Operator or its Affiliates engage in Gross Negligence/Willful Misconduct[62] that
proximately causes the Parties to incur damage, loss, cost, or liability for claims,
demands or causes of action referred to in Article 4.6.A or 4.6.B, then, in addition to its Participating Interest share:
Alternative Provision, Choose one
Alternative #1 - No Limitation
Operator shall bear all such damages, losses, costs, and liabilities.
Alternative #2 - Joint Property Limitation
Operator shall bear only the actual damage, loss, cost, and liability to repair,
replace and/or remove Joint Property[63] so damaged or lost, if any.
Alternative #3 - Financial Limitation
Operator shall bear only the first [__________ U.S. dollars] of such damages,
losses, costs, and liabilities.64

While the AIPN 2012 JOA definition of gross negligence/willful misconduct is probably much the same as the common law meaning, the optional
provision offers non-operators less recourse than any of the AAPL model
forms. The AIPN clause requires that the liability-triggering action or
omission be that of a supervisor, usually a relatively high-level supervisor.
Further, the actual liability of the operator may be limited by the nature of

61 “Senior Supervisory Personnel means, with respect to a Party, any director or officer
of such Party, and any individual who functions for such Party or one of its Affiliates at a
management level equivalent or superior to any individual functioning as such Party’s . . . .”
Id. at art. 1.1. The parties entering into the agreement can choose from one of the five tiers
of supervisory duties, ranging from field supervisors to county managers. See id. Generally, the parties choose Alternative No. 4 (senior managers reporting directly to the county
manager) or Alternative No. 5 (county manager).
62 “Gross

Negligence/Willful Misconduct” is defined as

any act or failure to act (whether sole, joint or concurrent) by any person or
entity that was intended to cause, or was in reckless disregard of or wanton indifference to, harmful consequences such person or entity knew, or should have
known, such act or failure would have on the safety or property of another person or entity.
Id.
63 “Joint Property means, at any point in time, all wells, facilities, equipment, materials,
information, funds, and property (other than Hydrocarbons) held for use in Joint Operations.” Id. It does not include either damage to the formation or environmental damage.
64 AIPN

2012 JOA, at art. 4.6.D.
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the damage, the amount, or both. Some have criticized the AIPN forms for
the breadth of the exculpatory language.65
The structure of the CAPL, AMPLA, and UKOOA model forms is
similar to that of the AAPL forms; an operator that is grossly negligent or
engages in willful misconduct is subject to full liability for damages. But
the scope of the exculpatory language in the three forms is different. Clause
3.04 of the CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure provides that:
The Operator will manage all Joint Property and conduct all Joint Operations
diligently, in a good and workmanlike manner, in compliance with the Title
Documents and the Regulations and in accordance with good oilfield practice,
including prudent reservoir management and conservation principles. Insofar as
the Operator hires contractors hereunder, it will supervise them as is reasonable.
Notwithstanding the preceding portion of this Clause, a breach of the obligations
contained in this Clause will not result in any form of liability (whether in tort,
contract or otherwise) of the Operator to the Parties, except insofar as the conduct
65 Murphy & Sutcliffe, supra note 27, at 9; Philip Weems & Michael Bolton, King & Spalding LLP, “Highlights of Key Revisions—2002 AIPN Model Form International Operating
Agreement,” at 4 (2002). Interestingly, the final draft of the AIPN 2012 JOA included
another optional provision that would have made the operator liable for administrative
failures:

Optional Provision, Choose, if desired. If not chosen check
cross-references.
4.6.E	Despite Article 4.6.D, Operator (i) shall not be released from or indemnified for, and (ii) shall bear all, damages, losses, costs, and/or liabilities
arising out of, incident to, or resulting from:
4.6.E.1	Operator’s indemnity obligation under Article 20.1;
4.6.E.2	A final adjudication, or an admission or settlement of allegations, that
Operator, its Affiliates, or any of their personnel misappropriated or
embezzled funds paid to or held by the Operator under this Agreement;
4.6.E.3	A final adjudication, or an admission or settlement of allegations, that
Operator, its Affiliates, or any of their personnel engaged in Gross Negligence / Willful Misconduct that proximately caused Operator not to
properly perform one or more of the following administrative, accounting, financial, or procedural duties or functions:
			 (a)	adherence to approved Work Programs and Budgets and AFE’s
under Article 4.2.B.1;
			 (b)	receipt, payment, and accounting of funds under Article 4.2.B.3 and
the Accounting Procedure;
			 (c)	supplying data and filing reports under Article 4.4.A;
			 (d)	procurement and maintenance of insurance under Article 4.7;
			 (e)	
compliance with contract award requirements under Articles
4.2.B.16 and 6.6; and/or
			 (f)	compliance with over-expenditure limitations and approvals under
Article 6.8.
It was not included in the final version of the AIPN 2012 JOA.
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to which the breach pertains constitutes Gross Negligence or Wilful Misconduct[66]
for which the Operator is solely responsible under Article 4.00.67

This language would appear to provide protection for an operator similar
to the Abraxus line of cases. The exculpatory language extends only to the
“breach of the obligations contained in this Clause,” and the clause imposes
obligations relating to “management of Joint Property” and the “conduct
of Joint Operations.”68 Thus, non-operators could recover damages for
breaches of the contract other than a breach of “good oilfield practice,”69
a breach of the health, safety, and environmental risks provision,70 and a
breach of the title maintenance provisions.71
The AMPLA 2011 JOA, on the other hand, appears to extend the exculpatory language to all of the operator’s activities, as does Reeder. The
AMPLA 2011 JOA does not use the term “gross negligence,” but defines
“Wilful Misconduct” to mean “any act or failure to act which was intended
to cause, or was in reckless disregard or wanton indifference to, the foreseeable consequences of such action or failure to act.”72 Clause 6.5 then
continues:
Except as a Participant to the extent of its Percentage Share, the Operator is not
liable to the Participants for any loss sustained or liability incurred in connection
with the Joint Venture, even if arising from the negligence of the Operator or
any person for whom the Operator may be vicariously liable, except where, in

66 The CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure defines “Gross Negligence or Wilful Misconduct” as:

any act, omission or failure to act (whether sole, joint or concurrent) by a person
that was intended to cause, or was in reckless disregard of, or wanton indifference
to, the harmful consequences to the safety or property of another person or to
the environment which the person acting or failing to act knew (or should have
known) would result from such act, omission or failure to act. However, Gross
Negligence or Wilful Misconduct does not include any act, omission or failure
to act insofar as it: (i) constituted mere ordinary negligence; or (ii) was done or
omitted in accordance with the express instructions or approval of all Parties,
insofar as the act, omission or failure to act otherwise constituting Gross Negligence or Wilful Misconduct was inherent in those instructions or that approval.
CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 1.2.
67 Id.

at cl. 3.04 (emphasis added).

68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.

at cl. 3.05A.

71 Id.

at cl. 3.10A. This is the conclusion of Mills, Wright & Inch, supra note 21, at 375.

72 AMPLA

2011 JOA, at cl. 1.1.
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a particular case, the Operator (or that person) has committed fraud or Wilful
Misconduct.73

The reference to “in connection with the Joint Venture” is broader than
“breach of the obligations contained in this Clause.”
Similarly, the UKOOA 2009 JOA uses language that probably would be
interpreted consistently with the Reeder interpretation:
The Operator shall not be liable for and each Participant (including for the avoidance of doubt the Participant designated as Operator) shall defend, indemnify
and hold the Operator harmless:
(a) to the extent of the indemnifying Participant’s Percentage Interest from
and against any loss, damage or claim by or liability to any person, whether
a Participant or not, (including any award of damages and any legal or
other costs and expenses incurred in respect of such claim or liability)
which arises, whether directly or indirectly, out of the performance, nonperformance or misperformance by the Operator of any of its duties or obligations as Operator hereunder . . . , irrespective of negligence and/or breach
of duty (whether statutory or otherwise) on the part of the Operator, except
only for any loss, damage, claim or liability resulting from or arising out of:
(i)

the Wilful Misconduct of the Operator; or

(ii) the failure of the Operator to obtain or maintain any insurance which
it is required to obtain and maintain . . . , except where the Operator
has used all reasonable endeavours to obtain or maintain any such
insurance but has been unable to do so and has promptly notified the
Participants participating or proposing to participate therein . . . .74

The exculpatory language extends to losses that arise “whether directly
or indirectly, out of the performance, non-performance or misperformance by the Operator of any of its duties or obligations as Operator
hereunder . . . .”75
The AAPL offshore model forms show a similar split. The AAPL Form
710-2002 Model Form Offshore Operating Agreement (2002 AAPL Offshore JOA) limits the liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct
to “operations.”76 But the AAPL Form 810-2007 Model Form Deepwater
Operating Agreement (2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA) requires gross negligence or willful misconduct to impose liability for either “activities or
operations” under the JOA or affecting the lease, which would appear to
apply to breaches of contract.77
73 Id.

at cl. 6.5 (emphasis added).

74 UKOOA
75 Id.

2009 JOA, at cl. 6.2.4.

at cl. 6.2.4(a).

76 2002

AAPL Offshore JOA, at art. 5.2. The form uses the phrase “activities and operations” in several other articles.
77 2007

AAPL Deepwater JOA, at art. 5.2.
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On balance, the Abraxus line of cases, limiting the scope of the “gross
negligence or willful misconduct” exclusion to the conduct of operations
or breaches of express or implied obligations that relate to operations, is a
more workable result, though Professor Smith’s analysis of the purpose of
the language changes is compelling.78 As stated by the Tenth Circuit in
Shell Rocky Mountain Production, LLC v. Ultra Resources, Inc.,79 requiring a showing of gross negligence or willful misconduct to impose liability
on an operator makes sense for physical operations because the interests
of the operator and the non-operators are aligned, but “it is nonsensical
to apply such a standard to administrative and accounting duties where
the operator can profit by cheating, or simply overcharging, its working
interest owners.”80 Oil and gas operations are indeed risky, but we should
expect that all the parties, including operators, will perform the promises
of their contracts.
Perhaps the best approach for the drafting committee is to let the parties
make the choice. A new model form should give the parties the options
to decide to make the operator liable only for gross negligence or willful
misconduct for both the conduct of operations and for breaches of contract, give the operator the protection of the exculpatory language only for
operations, or subject the operator to full liability for both negligence and
breach of contract.

[3] Suggestions for the Drafters
[a] Provide Cost Overrun Options
However broadly their exculpatory provisions are interpreted, several
of the model forms contain provisions that potentially take the edge off
the limitation of the operator’s liability and that the drafting committee
should consider offering as options in the context of cost overruns, which

78 Not

everyone will agree.

While the courts’ construction of the JOA in Abraxas and Fagadau is reasonable, it arguably imposes an unfair burden of liability on the operator for contract
performance. Unlike many contracts where profit is the main goal of performance, the operator’s performance under the JOA does not entail the normal
expectation of operation for profit.
Arthur J. Wright, “Joint Operating Agreements—Common Amendments and Mistakes,” 50
Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 7-1, 7-9 (2004).
79 415
80 Id.

F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005).

at 1171.
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are probably the most common source of disputes between operators and
non-operators.81 The AIPN 2012 JOA provides that:
6.9.A	For commitments and expenditures with respect to any line item of
an approved Work Program and Budget, Operator shall be entitled
to incur in connection with the corresponding Joint Operation without further approval of the Operating Committee a combined overcommitmentand over-expenditure for such line item up to ten percent
(10%) of the authorized amount for such line item; provided that the
cumulative total of all over-commitments and over-expenditures for a
Calendar Year shall not exceed five percent (5%) of the total annual
Work Program and Budget in question.
6.9.B		At such time Operator reasonably anticipates that the total amount of
the commitments and expenditures actually incurred plus the commitments to be incurred with respect to such line item exceeds the
limits of Article 6.9.A, Operator shall furnish to the Operating Committee Operator’s reasonably detailed estimate of the total commitments
and expenditures required to carry out the Joint Operation corresponding to such line item, together with supporting information.82

In other words, if the operator’s cost overruns exceed 10% of any line item or
5% of the annual work program and budget, it must provide the operating
committee an authority for expenditure (AFE). The AIPN 2012 JOA allows
alternatives as to whether the AFE is informational only, or is a supplemental expenditure that the operating committee must approve and reflect in
a revised work program and budget.83 If the supplemental-expenditure
alternative is chosen, it is clear “that the overexpenditures approved by the
Operating Committee are to be included in the relevant Work Program
& Budget used to determine Operator’s authority to subsequently incur
overexpenditures without Operating Committee approval.”84
81 Operations under a JOA are typically based upon an authority for expenditure (AFE),
which is usually prepared and circulated by the operator. There is no standard form for an
AFE, and often non-operators are unhappy with the amount of detail the operator provides.
Regardless of the amount of detail an operator gives, however, the case law is clear that an
AFE is nothing but a device to implement the JOA by facilitating decision making, and that
its estimates of the cost of proposed operations are just that—estimates. A non-operator
that agrees to participate in an operation under a JOA is responsible for its share of cost
overruns, and can successfully challenge them only if the operator has incurred them in
bad faith, or they are excessive, unreasonable, or unauthorized by the AFE or JOA. See, e.g.,
M & T, Inc. v. Fuel Res. Dev. Co., 518 F. Supp. 285 (D. Colo. 1981) (actual costs of drilling a
well were nearly twice what the AFE showed). There have been much worse cost overruns.
See Parejo Ltd. 1981 v. Getty Oil Co., Nos. CV F-85-150, CV F-85-217, 1991 WL 260436
(E.D. Cal. May 28, 1991) (an AFE of $4.4 million was followed by a well that cost at least
$18 million).
82 AIPN

2012 JOA, at art. 6.9 (emphasis added).

83 Id.
84 Weems

& Bolton, supra note 65, at 11.
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But what if the operating committee does not approve the operator’s supplementary AFE? The AIPN provision on cost overruns neither expressly
caps the liability of the non-operators nor imposes liability for excessive
overruns on the operator, but merely opens the door for the participation
of the operating committee.85
The Canadian and Australian JOA model counterparts contain similar
provisions. The CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure provides:
AFE Overexpenditures-A Party’s approval of an AFE constitutes its approval of all
expenditures necessary to conduct the Operation described therein, subject to
the limitations or charges prescribed by the Accounting Procedure and Articles
8.00 and 9.00 for Horizontal Wells and a Casing Point election respectively.
However, the Operator will, for informational purposes only, promptly notify the
Non-Operators if it incurs or expects to incur expenditures for a Joint Operation
that exceeds the total amount estimated in the applicable AFE by more than the
greater of $50,000 or 10%. It will include in that notice its explanation for that
overexpenditure and its revised cost estimate for that Joint Operation. If that Joint
Operation relates to a well, the Operator will then provide estimates of current
and cumulative costs incurred therefor on a daily basis where practicable and
weekly estimates of forecast costs until that Joint Operation is completed.86

The AMPLA 2011 JOA merely states that “if the Operator expects there
will be a cost overrun in carrying out an Approved Programme which cannot be avoided by Good Australian Oilfield Practice, the Operator may
exceed a current Approved Budget by not more than 10%,” and requires
that the operator report any unbudgeted expenditure to the participants.87
It also authorizes the operating committee to decide whether to approve
cost overruns, but does not expressly address the liability of the operator if
the operating committee does not approve.88
85 The final draft of the AIPN 2012 JOA included an optional provision at article
4.6.E.3(f) that would have made an operator liable where “Gross Negligence/Willful Misconduct” caused the failure to comply “with over-expenditure limitations and approvals
under Article 6.8.” See supra note 65. It was not included in the final version.
86 CAPL

2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 3.2C (emphasis added).

87 AMPLA

2011 JOA, at cl. 8.4(a)(ii).

88 Id. at cl. 5.2(c). John Grace, the principal drafter of the AMPLA 2011 JOA, commented
as follows:

On the question of non-approval in Australia of more than 10% cost overrun,
if the Operator has committed to the expenditure without authority/approval
(whether actual or ostensible, or by AFE whether prospective or retrospective)
it must carry the cost itself. It is a useful restraining mechanism. This is not
expressly stated but is the logical legal conclusion.
However there is also an unwritten rule in Australia that, once you appoint the
Operator you support it through thick and thin—hell or high water—in all reasonable circumstances including those that may not necessarily be Good Operating Practice, so long as it was not Wilful Misconduct. So it would be rare for an
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Logical though it may be that an operator that incurs costs in excess of the
contract limits without prior or subsequent approval of the non-operators
should have to bear those costs, an express statement in the contract of the
effect of excessive cost overruns is preferable. Professors Smith and Weaver
have suggested that a JOA might include a clause putting the “entire risk”
of excessive cost overruns on the operator or, alternatively, requiring that
the operator circulate a new AFE that the non-operators can approve or
disapprove.89 Either structure poses a dilemma for an operator. “Given the
nature of the oil and gas industry, an operator may not reasonably know
that the overexpenditure limits have been exceeded until the operation is
completed and the overexpenditure has been incurred.”90
But several of the model forms contain provisions similar to those suggested by Professors Smith and Weaver.91 Both the 2002 AAPL Offshore
JOA and the 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA contain provisions requiring a
supplemental AFE and election to participate in the event that the operator
exceeds overexpenditure limits, though using somewhat different terms.
Article 8.7 of the 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA, an optional provision, states:
If Operator determines that the Overexpenditure will exceed the Allowable Variance,[92] Operator shall submit a new AFE for the current operation
(“Supplemental AFE”) for approval of the Participating Parties. The Participating

Operating Committee not to approve a greater than 10% cost overrun, provided
it was reasonable within fairly flexible parameters. There would of course be
much huffing and puffing before this position was reached.
Email from John Grace to John Lowe (May 27, 2014).
89 See Ernest E. Smith & Jacqueline Lang Weaver, 3 Tex. L. of Oil & Gas § 17.3[C][1] (2d
ed. 2006).
90 Josephson, supra note 11, at 17-18. Further, drafting a functional excessive-cost clause
may be hard to do. In Pegasus Energy Group, Inc. v. Cheyenne Petroleum Co., 3 S.W.3d 112
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christie 1999, pet. denied), the court held that an exploration agreement that required the non-operators to approve “any expenditures which exceed the AFEs
attached hereto by ten percent (10.00%) or more,” required the operator to obtain approval
for drilling costs that exceeded its AFEs by 10% on a well-by-well basis, rather than on a
line-by-line or item-by-item basis. Id. at 122.
91 Some drafts of the AAPL Form 610-1989 had such a provision that was not adopted
in the final version. See Derman, supra note 47, at 183–84.
92 The

“Allowable Variance” is defined as an

Overexpenditure . . . no more than the greater of __________ Dollars ($_____)
or __________ percent (___%), or in the case of an operation involving the
design, construction, and installation of a Platform, or Development Facilities,
no more than the greater of __________ Dollars ($_____) or __________ percent (___%) . . . .
2002 AAPL Offshore JOA, at art. 8.7.
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Parties may then elect whether to continue to participate within __________
(___) days or __________ (___) hours if a rig is on location, [ ] inclusive [ ]
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and federal holidays, after receipt of the Supplemental AFE. If fewer than all, but one (1) or more Participating Parties elect
to continue to participate in the current operation and agree to pay and bear
one hundred percent (100%) of the costs and risks of conducting it, Operator
shall continue to conduct the current operation. Otherwise, the operation shall
cease.93

The 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA provides that:
Except as provided in Article 6.2.3 (Further Operations During a Force Majeure),
if it appears (based upon the Operator’s reasonable estimate) that the actual
Costs associated with an original AFE or its approved supplemental AFEs will
exceed the relevant permitted over-expenditure set forth below,[94] the Operator
shall promptly submit a supplemental AFE to the Participating Parties. A supplemental AFE shall include the dollar amount of the permitted over-expenditure
from the previously approved AFE as part of the dollar amount of that supplemental AFE. Subject to Article 8.6.1 (Well Proposals, Recompletions, and Workovers), after receipt of the supplemental AFE each Participating Party has the
right to make an Election as to its further participation in the approved activity
or operation.95

The UKOOA 2009 JOA does not permit a non-operator to elect not to
participate further, but affirmatively requires the overspending operator
to seek “prior approval” of the operating committee to incur additional
expenses, which makes it easier to conclude that an operator that does not
do so is financially responsible:
The Operator shall use reasonable endeavours not to exceed the approved exploration and/or appraisal Budget but shall be entitled without prior approval of the
Joint Operating Committee to incur expenditure:
(a) in excess of an approved AFE up to the lesser of ten per cent (10%) of the
amount of the approved AFE and [   ]Pounds (£[   ]); and
(b) subject to (a) above, in excess of an approved exploration and/or appraisal
Budget up to [   ] per cent ([   ]%) of the amount of the approved
Budget.
Whenever it appears to the Operator that the over-expenditure for any item will
exceed the amount authorised under this clause 10.5, the Operator shall revise
the appropriate AFE and/or Budget and will seek the prior approval of the Joint
Operating Committee to incur the additional expenditure prior to entering into
any further commitment.96

93 Id.
94 The “permitted over-expenditure” is the lesser of a percentage of the AFE amount or
a dollar amount, both of which are negotiated and may be different for different kinds of
operations. See 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA, at arts. 6.2.2.1–.4.
95 Id.

at art. 6.2.2.

96 UKOOA

2009 JOA, at cl. 10.5.
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But the clearest statement found was that of the final draft of the AIPN
2012 JOA, which included an optional provision that was dropped from
the final version of the form:
4.6.E		Despite Article 4.6.D, Operator (i) shall not be released from or
indemnified for, and (ii) shall bear all, damages, losses, costs, and/or
liabilities arising out of, incident to, or resulting from:
....
		(f) compliance with over-expenditure limitations and approvals under
Article 6.8.97

For better or worse, limitation of the operator’s liability by reference to
gross negligence or willful misconduct or both is a part of operating agreements around the world. Some protection for the operator is generally justifiable, given the risks of the oil business. But the most common source of
dispute—cost overruns—should be expressly addressed in a revised AAPL
form using the approaches illustrated by the contract language quoted
above as options.

[b] Provide an Option for an Operating
Committee
Perhaps my most controversial suggestion will be that the drafting committee should also include in the new model form an option for an operating committee. Andrew Derman and James Barnes argued at the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Annual Institute in 1996 that offshore
and international operations were better conducted using an operating
committee than the traditional U.S./Canadian onshore structure:
Historically, the first model form operating agreements were drafted to address
the drilling of onshore wells primarily in the United States, where individual
autonomy is a prized tradition. These agreements were conceived to deal with
relatively unsophisticated technology, low cost wells, high margin prices, and
small lease areas held under a property ownership system that fosters unilateral
initiative. Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the parties to
delegate broad authority to one of them to organize the drilling of an exploratory
well and to develop the field.98

They urged that in offshore and international operations, an operating
committee was a more efficient structure because of the large contract
97 See

supra note 65.

98 Andrew B. Derman & James Barnes, “Autonomy Versus Alliance: An Examination
of the Management and Control Provisions of Joint Operating Agreements,” 42 Rocky Mt.
Min. L. Inst. 4-1, 4‑12 (1996). See also id. at 4-6 (“The rationale generally given for this
structure of autonomy and non-association is to avoid adverse U.S. tax effects and to limit
liability among the co-adventurers. . . . A corollary consequence is the creation of a structure that reserves maximum autonomy to each individual co-adventurer and contemplates
minimum cooperative action among the co-adventurers.”).
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areas, sophisticated technology, and expensive drilling and development
involved; non-operators simply cannot afford to be “passive investors” in
offshore and international operations.99
Derman and Barnes could have been writing about shale development
and other operations involving horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing,
which are fast becoming the normal drilling and completing techniques.
Horizontal drilling now accounts for more than 60% of all rig activity in
the United States.100 And 90% of oil and gas wells in the United States
undergo hydraulic fracturing to stimulate production.101 With advanced
technology come higher costs. “Horizontal well costs are generally 20%
to 25% higher than vertical well costs . . . .”102 More expensive rigs needed
for horizontal drilling coupled with more fracking has raised costs “from
$2 million to $5–6 million per well in the Woodford Shale of Southeast
Oklahoma.”103 “A typical Bakken well costs $8–10 million with about
$1.5–2.5 million in fracking cost.”104 And a single Marcellus well may have
direct costs of more than $7.6 million.105 In the context of complicated and
expensive technologies, it is in the interests of both operators and nonoperators that the JOA include an option for a process that brings all the
parties—non-operators and the operator—together periodically to discuss
and analyze projects and the technologies to perform them.
The AIPN, AMPLA, and UKOOA model forms all provide for operating
committees.106 Neither the CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure nor the AAPL
forms do, but RMMLF Form 1 and RMMLF Form 2 state that operations
“shall be subject to supervision and control by the Parties,”107 and require
99 Id.
100 See Independent Petroleum Ass’n of Am. (IPAA), “U.S. Oil Technology Revolutionizing Development,” http://oilindependents.org/u-s-oil-technology-revolutionizingdevelopment/.
101 See IPAA, “Hydraulic Fracturing: Effects on Energy Supply, the Economy, and the
Environment” (Apr. 2008).
102 U.S.

Envtl. Prot. Agency, “Directional Drilling Technology,” at 6 (Dec. 10, 2012).

103 Timothy

Fitzgerald, “Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing,” 63
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1337, 1353 (2013).
104 Id.

at 1352.

105 William

E. Hefley et al., “The Economic Impact of the Value Chain of a Marcellus
Shale Well,” at 65 tbl.12 (Pitt. Bus. Working Paper Aug. 30 2011).
106 See AIPN 2012 JOA, at arts. 5.1–.13; AMPLA 2011 JOA, at cl. 5.1–.8; UKOOA 2009
JOA, at cl. 9.1–.10.
107 RMMLF

Form 1, at art. 7.1; RMMLF Form 2, at art. 14.1.
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that “a meeting shall be called by Unit Operator upon written request of
any Party . . . .”108
Using an operating committee undoubtedly raises the risk that an operator will be held to have a fiduciary obligation to the non-operators, which
no operator wants, as well as the risk that the operator and non-operators
will be jointly and severally liable to third parties.109 The greater the control of the non-operators is, the greater the risk is that the parties will not
be treated as cotenants.110 To some degree, this risk can be minimized by
careful drafting; all of the model forms contain similar provisions disclaiming the existence of a partnership, denying the intention to create a joint
venture or mining partnership, and purporting to negate any fiduciary
relationship.111 But whatever the risk of being classified as joint venturers
or mining partners, the changes in the technologies and economics of the
industry may require more cooperative decision making than the current
AAPL forms provide for. Including an option for an operating committee
in the new model form is one way to open the door to more cooperation.

[c] Provide for Consultation
Alternatively, AAPL’s drafting committee should consider imposing a
consultation obligation on the operator. While any interaction between the
operator and non-operators may give support to third-party claims of joint
and several liability, the exposure from consultation is minimal.
Several of the model forms contain mandatory-consultation language.
The CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, which contains no provision for an
operating committee, nonetheless provides for mandatory consultation:

108 RMMLF Form 1, at art. 7.3; RMMLF Form 2, at art. 14.3. RMMLF Form 1 provides
for a negotiated percentage of participating interest to make the call, while RMMLF Form
2 states that “any Party having voting power on any matter to be considered” may call for
a meeting.
109 As discussed in § 27.01, supra, one of the reasons for using an operating agreement is
to minimize the risk of the parties being regarded as a joint venture, owing fiduciary duties
to each other and being jointly and severally liable to others. See Ernest E. Smith, “The
Operator: Liability to Non-Operators, Resignation, Removal and Selection of a Successor,”
Oil & Gas Agreements: Joint Operations 2-1, 2-4 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2008).
110 Boigon & Murphy, supra note 3, at 159 (noting that in mining partnership cases,
mutual control often proves most important in determining whether an enterprise constitutes a joint venture).
111 See AAPL Form 610-1989, at arts. V.A, VII.A; AIPN 2012 JOA, at art. 14.1; AMPLA
2011 JOA, at cl. 3.3(f), 3.4(d); CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 1.5; RMMLF Form
2, at art. 28.2; UKOOA 2009 JOA, at cl. 22.2.1; 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA, at art. 19.1; 2007
AAPL Deepwater JOA, at art. 22.1. See also Smith, supra note 109, at 2-4; Pierce, supra note
6, at 1-20 to 1-21.
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The Operator will consult with the Parties periodically about the exploration,
development and operation of the Joint Lands, the construction, installation and
operation of any Production Facility and management of the Joint Property. It
will keep them informed in a timely manner about Joint Operations planned or
conducted by it. Subject to this Agreement, the Parties delegate to the Operator,
on their behalf, management of the exploration, development and operation of
the Joint Lands and management of the other Joint Property.112

And both the 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA and the 2007 AAPL Deepwater
JOA contain a similar, but more general provision: “unless otherwise provided in this agreement, the operator shall consult with the non-operating
parties and keep them informed of important matters.”113 RMMLF Form 2
also has similar language:
In the conduct of operations hereunder, Unit Operator shall: . . . Consult freely
with the Parties within the area affected by any operation hereunder and keep
them advised of all matters arising in operations hereunder which Unit Operator
deems important, in the exercise of its best judgment.114

[d] Provide an Option for Secondment
Another concept adopted in the AIPN model forms in the 2002 and
2012 versions that the AAPL drafting committee should include as an
option in a new model form is secondment. “Secondment” means “placement . . . of an employee of a Non-Operator or its Affiliate in Operator’s
organization . . . .”115 Under the AIPN forms, it is limited in use to “situations requiring particular expertise or involving projects of a technical,
operational or economically challenging nature.”116
[T]he concept of Secondment [is that] Non-Operator personnel with particular
expertise and experience are integrated into the Operator’s organization for the
limited purpose of conducting a particularly complex Joint Operation . . . [as]
a way to enhance the Operator’s technical capabilities without diluting overall
accountability and the Operator’s responsibility for Joint Operations.117

Secondment also provides non-operators “inside information” about the
joint operations, though it is usual to restrict confidential information to
that to which the non-operator is entitled under the JOA, and may facilitate
a smoother working relationship between the operator and non-operators.
The AMPLA 2011 JOA contains a broader secondment provision in clause
112 CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 3.2A. The UKOOA 2009 JOA has consultation language at clause 6.9 in addition to the provision for an operating committee.
113 2002

AAPL Offshore JOA, at art. 5.2; 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA, at art. 5.2.

114 RMMLF Form 2, at art. 16.1.D. RMMLF Form 1 has similar language at article 9.1.C.
115 AIPN
116 Id.

2012 JOA, at art. 1.1 [Alternative No. 3].

at art. 4.3.C.

117 Weems

& Bolton, supra note 65, at 3.
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7.8, which permits the operator to request or a non-operator to nominate “suitable management and technical personnel for particular Joint
Operations,” though neither the operator nor a non-operator is required
to accept or provide any proposed secondee.118 The UKOOA 2009 JOA is
particularly well formulated and flexible, in this author’s opinion:
Secondment
6.11.1	The Participants agree that in certain circumstances a collaborative
effort between them may be beneficial to Joint Operations. Such collaborative effort may include the secondment by a Non-Operator of
personnel to the Operator’s organisation:
		

(a)	to work on a term assignment as a member of a project team; or

		

(b)	to fill organisational positions;

		in respect of Joint Operations. The length of any assignment shall be
agreed between the Non-Operator and the Operator. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Non-Operator shall have the right on giving
three (3) months notice, to withdraw its employee from any such
assignment.
		The Operator shall have the right to require the removal of any person
seconded to its organisation for reasonable cause.
6.11.2	In respect of any person seconded to the Operator’s organisation
under clause 6.11.1 for the period of such secondment:
		

(a)	such person shall remain the employee of the Participant which
seconded him and such Participant shall remain responsible
for all the legal obligations of an employer associated with such
employment;

		

(b)	all costs associated with the employment of such person (including salary and employee benefits) and all costs associated with
his secondment to the organisation of the Operator shall be
chargeable to the Joint Account; and

		

(c)	all work undertaken by such person shall be Joint Operations
and accordingly the Operator shall retain overall responsibility
for such work and such person (and the Participant which seconded him) shall benefit from all indemnities and limitations of
liability applying to the Operator hereunder, including those set
forth in clause 6.2.4 in relation to such work.119

§ 27.03 Operator Removal—Is Gross Negligence or Willful
Misconduct Necessary to Justify Removal?
The practical remedy provided to non-operators by all the model form
operating agreements for bad behavior by an operator is operator removal.
118 AMPLA

2011 JOA, at cl. 7.8(b).

119 UKOOA

2009 JOA, at cl. 6.11.
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But under the model forms, once a party has been designated as operator,
it is not easily removed. Difficulty of removal, like limited liability, follows
from the relationship of the operator and non-operators. The operator
serves to facilitate the goals of the economic partnership of the working
interest owners, rather than as a for-hire administrator. The operator does
not make a profit or collect fees as operator. The operator is at risk, just like
everybody else involved in the venture. So the operator ought to be protected against removal, as well as liability, except in unusual circumstances.

[1] Provisions of the AAPL Model Forms
The first AAPL model form, AAPL Form 610-1956, provided for change
of operator only when the operator sold all of its interest in the Contract
Area or resigned; under the 1956 model form, once a working interest
owner was elected operator it remained operator as long as it owned any
interest in the Unit Area, unless it chose to resign. Many thought that the
1956 form was too rigid, that some provision for operator removal was
desirable.120
The three later versions of the AAPL model form permit non-operators
to remove the operator, but only for cause and after process. The 1977 and
1982 model forms provided in article V.B.1 that “Operator may be removed
if it fails or refuses to carry out its duties hereunder.”121 As Robert Bledsoe
commented, “ ‘[f]ailure or refusal to carry out [its] duties’ is a fertile area
for evidentiary development . . . .”122
An interpretative problem with the 1977 and 1982 forms was whether
the reference to “fails or refuses to carry out its duties” requires nonoperators to show that the operator has been grossly negligent or guilty of
willful misconduct in order to justify removal. To this author, the reference
to “duties” is broader than the obligation imposed to conduct operations
in a “good and workmanlike manner,” to which the terms of the exculpatory language apply, but the argument was raised in operator-removal

120 See, e.g., Young, supra note 9, at 219. The Foundation’s first form, RMMLF Form 1,
had no operator-removal provision either.
121 The 1977 and 1982 forms differed as to the percentage the non-operators had to
control. The 1977 form required “the affirmative vote of two (2) or more Non-Operators
owning a majority interest based on ownership as shown on Exhibit ‘A’, and not on the
number of parties remaining after excluding the voting interest of Operator.” AAPL Form
610-1977, at art. V.B.1. The 1982 form provided for “the affirmative vote of two (2) or more
Non-Operators owning a majority interest based on ownership as shown on Exhibit ‘A’
remaining after excluding the voting interest of Operator.” AAPL Form 610-1982, at art.
V.B.1.
122 Bledsoe,

supra note 26, at 8-5.
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litigation,123 and several commentators have noted it: “[t]he combination
of ‘for cause’ removal clauses along with such a high standard of liability
under the AAPL 1977 and 1982 forms makes an operator virtually removal
proof . . . .”124
AAPL Form 610-1989 clarified the standards and process for for-cause
removal of the operator by requiring notice and an opportunity for cure,
and by replacing the “fails or refuses to carry out its duties” language with
removal for “good cause,” which is defined broadly, to make it clear that the
operator-removal standard was a lower threshold than “gross negligence or
willful misconduct”:
Operator may be removed only for good cause by the affirmative vote of NonOperators owning a majority interest based on ownership as shown on Exhibit
“A” remaining after excluding the voting interest of Operator; such vote shall not
be deemed effective until a written notice has been delivered to the Operator
by a Non-Operator detailing the alleged default and Operator has failed to cure
the default within thirty (30) days from its receipt of the notice or, if the default
concerns an operation then being conducted, within forty‑eight (48) hours of its
receipt of the notice. For purposes hereof, “good cause” shall mean not only gross
negligence or willful misconduct but also the material breach of or inability to meet
the standards of operation contained in Article V.A. or material failure or inability
to perform its obligations under this agreement.125

[2] Provisions of Other Model Forms
Several of the model forms address the issue of whether operator removal
requires a showing of gross negligence or willful misconduct, at least indirectly. RMMLF Form 2’s language relating to operator removal is similar
to that in the 1977 and 1982 AAPL model forms, but authorizes removal
for breach of “duties or obligations,” rather than just “duties,” which may be
sufficient to avoid the issue of whether the breach must rise to the level of
“gross negligence or willful misconduct”:
Upon default or failure in performance of its duties or obligations under the Unit
Agreement, Unit Operator may be removed by the Approval of the Parties after
excluding the voting interest of the Unit Operator, and the Parties shall, or any
123 See Tri-Star Petroleum Co. v. Tipperary Corp., 101 S.W.3d. 583, 589–90 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2003, pet. denied); R & R Res. Corp. v. Echelon Oil & Gas, L.L.C., No. 03-05-00479CV, 2006 WL 66458, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 10, 2006) (mem. op.).
124 Brian R. Bjella, “Removing the Operator Under the Joint Operating Agreement:
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do,” 45 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 11-1, 11-21 (1999) (citing Milam
Randolph Pharo, “Duties and Obligations Revisited—Who Bears What Risk of Loss?” The
Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreement 4-1, 4-16 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 1990)).
125 AAPL Form 610-1989, at art. V.B.1 (emphasis added). Article V.D lists rights and
duties of the operator, and article XV.D also provides that “the failure of any party to this
agreement to comply with all of its financial obligations provided herein shall be a material
default.” That failure to pay bills is a material breach is implicit in all the JOA forms, though
it is best made express.
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Party may, promptly give written notice to the Unit Operator of such Approval
of the Parties to remove the Unit Operator detailing the default or failure in
performance.126

The 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA permits operator removal where there is a
“substantial breach of a material provision,”127 undoubtedly on the theory
that gross negligence or willful misconduct would meet that standard,
while “substantial breach of a material provision” would not require gross
negligence or willful misconduct. The provisions of the CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure and the AMPLA 2011 JOA are similar. The CAPL 2007
Operating Procedure provides that:
The Operator will be replaced and another Operator appointed . . . if:
....
(b)	the Operator defaults in performance of any of its duties or obligations
hereunder . . . and does not begin to remedy diligently that default within
30 days after receiving a bona fide notice from Parties holding a majority of the Working Interests (excluding those of the Operator and any of
its Affiliates that are Parties), specifying the default in sufficient detail to
enable the Operator to understand its nature and requiring the Operator to
remedy it, provided that the Operator will be replaced immediately by an
interim Operator . . . if those duties or obligations must be fulfilled sooner
to protect life, property or the environment . . . .128

The counterpart provision in the AMPLA 2011 JOA addresses operator
removal in terms of the duration of the operator’s appointment. It states
that the operator’s appointment ends when “the Operator commits a Breach
Default Event and fails to remedy the default within 60 days of receipt of a
written notice of default served by a Participant.”129
Better to be sure. The 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA avoids the issue by
making either a finding of gross negligence or willful misconduct or “substantial breach of a material provision” of the contract that is not timely
cured cause for removal.130 And the UKOOA 2009 JOA provides both
that the joint operating committee may remove the operator at the end
of any month if “the Operator has committed any material breach of, or
failed to observe or perform any material obligation on its part contained
126 RMMLF
127 2002

Form 2, at art 17.2.B (emphasis added).

AAPL Offshore JOA, at art. 4.4(c).

128 CAPL

2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 2.3B (emphasis added). As discussed below,
even the reference to default of “any” of the operator’s duties or obligations will require the
showing of a material breach.
129 AMPLA 2011 JOA, at cl. 6.2(d). “Breach Default Event” is defined to include the
“Operator committing a material breach of any of its material obligations under this agreement . . . .” Id. at cl. 1.1.
130 See

2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA, at art. 4.4.2(a), (b).

27-32

Mineral Law Institute

§ 27.03[3]

in, this Agreement,”131 and for an option for immediate removal for “Wilful Misconduct.”132 Additionally, there is a note that “if these words [the
option for immediate removal] are deleted then any Wilful Misconduct is
assumed also to be a breach of the Operator’s obligations under the JOA
which would justify removal under 5.3.1,” which makes clear that material
breach of a material obligation need not rise to willful misconduct.

[3] The Operator-Removal Process
Ultimately, whether there is “cause” for operator removal is a fact question.133 Under the usual principles of contract interpretation, to support
removal of an operator by non-operators, the operator’s breach must be
material—a failure to conduct operations in a “good and workmanlike
manner,” a significant breach of contract duties, or some tortious conduct.
Further, materiality must be judged in context, considering the particular
breach in light of all of circumstances, including the totality of the operator’s duties under the agreement. The operating agreement specifies many
of the duties of the operator, but it also provides that the operator has the
duty to “conduct and direct and have full control of all operations” and that
“it shall conduct all such operations in a good and workmanlike manner.”
A single act might be so egregious that it would constitute grounds for
removal, for instance, if the operator committed an outright act of theft.
On the other hand, insignificant breaches of the operating agreement,
such as sending out billing statements a few days late, would not constitute grounds for removal. Whether there is cause for operator removal is
a question of the materiality of the breach when considered in light of all
of the functions performed by the operator in furthering the goals of the
project and in carrying out its contractual duties. As Howard Boigon has
observed, what those seeking to remove an operator must do is “prove that
the operator’s conduct is not within the latitude normally accepted by the
industry.”134
Proof of the failure or refusal of an operator to perform its duties under
the operating agreement, particularly in light of the operator’s obligation
131 UKOOA
132 Id.

2009 JOA, at cl. 5.3.1(a).

at cl. 5.3.2(i).

133 See Robert C. Bledsoe, “Operating Agreements from the Standpoint of the Nonopera-

tor,” Advanced Oil, Gas & Mineral L. Inst. (State Bar of Tex. Oct. 1985) (“[The meaning of
‘failure or refusal to carry out duties’] presents a fact issue . . . .”). See also Bledsoe, supra
note 26, at § 8.02.
134 Howard L. Boigon, “The Joint Operating Agreement in a Hostile Environment,” 38
Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax’n 5-1, 5-28 (Sw. Legal Fdn. 1987). Boigon was a principal drafter
of the AAPL Form 610-1989.
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to perform in a “good and workmanlike manner,” generally requires testimony of industry norm and custom. Whether or not the operator has
adhered to the standard of performance reasonably expected of operators
under similar circumstances is not a matter within the common understanding of a jury.
Many have thought that the standard for operator removal is objective, ultimately to be determined by a court, rather than by the subjective
determination of the non-operators. Tri-Star Petroleum Co. v. Tipperary
Corp.135 is to the contrary, however. There a Texas-based operator, Tri-Star
Petroleum Company (Tri-Star), and Australian non-operators used the
AAPL Form 610-1977 with a COPAS Model Form Accounting Procedure
to operate a 2.3-million-acre coalbed gas project in Queensland, Australia. The non-operators voted to remove Tri-Star, alleging both accounting and operational defaults. Tri-Star refused to step aside. Tipperary, the
newly elected operator, went to court in Texas and obtained a temporary
injunction requiring Tri-Star to hand over operations. Tri-Star then filed
an accelerated interlocutory appeal. One of Tri-Star’s arguments was that
the trial court had erred by granting a temporary injunction without determining that Tri-Star had failed or refused to perform its duties as operator under the JOA.136 Tri-Star argued that a judicial determination was a
condition precedent to the removal of an operator.137 The appellate court
considered the evidence that had been presented to the trial court, including both accounting and operational defaults, perhaps the worst of which
was that Tri-Star’s failures had required the venturers to relinquish parts of
the “Authority to Prospect” from Queensland. The appellate court stated
that “the trial court could [properly] conclude that the JOA provisions
were unambiguous and thus its terms should be given their plain, ordinary,
and generally accepted meaning.”138 Effectively, the court interpreted the
AAPL Form 610-1977 provisions to permit the non-operators to determine whether cause existed for operator removal.139

135 101
136 Id.

S.W.3d. 583 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, pet. denied).

at 590.

137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Brad Moody has characterized the two positions as “will of the court” and “will of
the majority.” See M. Bradford Moody, “Removing An Uncooperative Operator Under the
Model 610 Form Operating Agreement,” 34 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. L. Sec. Rep. 39, 50 (State
Bar of Tex. 2010).
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The underlying logic of Tri-Star is attractive: the parties who enter into
one of the model forms contractually agree that non-operators have the
right to determine whether cause exists under the circumstances. So long
as there is no indication that the non-operators have acted in bad faith or
unreasonably, there is no reason that judicial confirmation of their action
should be necessary. The fact remains, however, that there is no express
obligation under any of the AAPL model forms that the operator give up
operational control if it does not agree that cause existed for the removal
vote, so that operator-removal votes are likely to end up before the courts,
as was the case in Tri-Star. Until a court has ruled, the operator generally
continues to function in that capacity.140
And when courts rule, they often find in favor of the operator. Gifford
Operating Co. v. Indrex, Inc.141 illustrates the point.142 There, non-operators
owning a majority of the working interest voted to remove the operator.143
The opinion notes operational defects alleged by the non-operators.144
The court observed that the operator “must be free to exercise [its] good
judgment”145 and can be removed only if it “has failed to operate the well
in a good and workmanlike manner.”146 The court found that the operator
had operated the well in a good and workmanlike manner and thus could
not be removed, notwithstanding the majority vote of the working interest
owners who had asserted they had grounds for removal.147
Whether or not there is cause for removal, the process can be bloody,
as Tri-Star illustrates. “A vote to remove an operator will likely result in a
declaratory judgment action that will not be satisfactory to either party.”148

140 The reason may be pride. But it may also be economics. An operator has a financial
interest in continuing as operator, as discussed at § 27.01, supra.
141 No. 2:89-CV-0189, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22505 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 1992) (unreported).
142 So does Tri-Star. Even though the court found that the non-operators had properly
removed the operator, the operator continued to operate until the court ruled.
143 Gifford,

1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22505, at *4–5.

144 See

id. at *3–4 (alleging negligence in the design and execution of the fracture
treatment).
145 Id.

at *3.

146 Id.

at *4.

147 Id.

at *5.

148 Bjella,

supra note 124, at 11-21 (citing Pharo, supra note 124, at 4-17).
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Even if non-operators seek expedited injunctive relief, the litigation may
take years and cost a lot of money to resolve.149

[4] Suggestions for the Drafters
[a] Make the Operator-Removal Provisions More
Certain
A possible expediting solution would be to include a provision in the
operating agreement that follows the court’s reasoning in Tri-Star, making it clearer that determination whether good cause exists to remove an
operator is an appropriate function of the non-operators acting in good
faith. Arthur Wright has suggested that non-operators should insert language in article V.B.1 of the operating agreement that reads:
A judicial determination that good cause exists for removal of the Operator
shall not be a condition precedent to the removal of the Operator for good cause
becoming effective, provided that an Operator removed for good cause shall be
deemed reinstated as Operator if and when a valid judgment, which holds that
good cause did not exist for such removal, becomes final and non-appealable.
The Non-Operators would suffer irreparable harm if the removal of an Operator
for good cause is not made effective as provided above and the Non-Operators
shall be entitled to injunctive relief or other equitable relief to enforce any such
removal of Operator.150

Wright also suggests that the “good cause” definition in article V.B.1 be
modified to include “material failure or inability to perform its obligations,
duties, or responsibilities under this agreement.”151 That change would more
clearly include the “duties” of the operator listed in article V.D of the AAPL
Form 610-1989.152 Both changes would discourage litigation over how the
operator-removal process is supposed to work.
Finally, the drafting committee should consider providing specifically
that non-operators who seek to remove an operator will face no liability.153
The CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure has such a provision:
149 The non-operators’ vote to remove Tri-Star was in 1999. The decision of the court of
appeals was in 2003.

Professor Bruce Kramer and I once spent three days sequestered in a federal court house
waiting to testify (for opposing parties) in an operator-removal case. Killing time, we
calculated that the total of the likely charges for the lawyers and experts involved in the case
substantially exceeded any damages.
150 Wright,
151 Id.

supra note 78, at 7-16.

at 7-17.

152 “ ‘Rights and Duties’ might be considered to be different from ‘obligations.’ ” Moody,
supra note 139, at 42.
153 In Tri-Star Petroleum Co. v. Tipperary Corp., 101 S.W.3d. 583 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003,
pet. denied), Tri-Star asserted a barrage of claims against those who sought to remove it.
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No Recourse For Removal-An Operator that resigns or is replaced in accordance
with this Article will not have any claim or recourse against the other Parties
because of its resignation or replacement.154

[b] Provide an Option for Removal Without Cause
An alternative that AAPL’s drafting committee should consider is to give
non-operators the option to remove the operator without cause. Many
model forms include such an option, though it may be used infrequently
and the details of how it works differ. The first draft of what became the
AAPL Form 610-1989 included an optional provision providing that nonoperators might remove an operator without cause by a majority vote,
which was roundly criticized by large companies and dropped from the
final version.155 A removal-without-cause provision is included in the 2007
CAPL Operating Procedure, however, keyed to non-operators owning at
least 60% of the working interest:
Delayed Replacement-The Operator will be replaced and another Operator
appointed . . . if:
(a) at least two Parties holding at least 60% of the Working Interests agree, by
notice to the other Parties (including as a single Party for this purpose any
Affiliate thereof that is a Party), to replace the Operator, provided that a
single Party holding at least a 60% Working Interest may, by notice to the
other Parties, become the Operator hereunder, unless it: (i) would then be
subject to immediate replacement under Subclause 2.02A[156]; or (ii) is
then subject to a bona fide notice of default under Clause 5.05.157

154 CAPL

2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 2.6F. So does the UKOOA 2009 JOA:

The Operator shall have no claim against the Participants as a consequence of
the . . . removal of the Operator but such . . . removal shall be without prejudice
to any rights, obligations or liabilities which accrued during the period when the
Operator acted as such.
UKOOA 2009 JOA, at cl. 5.4.
155 See Derman, supra note 47, at 185; John Burritt McArthur, “Coming of Age: Initiating
the Oilfield into Performance Disclosure,” 50 SMU L. Rev. 663, 748 (1997).
156 Clause 2.02A provides for immediate replacement of a bankrupt or insolvent operator. Unlike the counterpart provision in the AAPL model contracts, it defines insolvency,
as being “unable to pay its debts as they fall due in the usual course of business or if it does
not have sufficient assets to satisfy its cumulative liabilities in full.” CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 2.3A(a). In Tri-Star Resources Ltd. v. J.C. International Petroleum Ltd.
(1986), 48 Alta. L.R. 2d 355, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 141 (Can. Alta. Q.B.), the court found that the
appointment of a receiver for the operator was sufficient to trigger the automatic removal
provisions of an earlier version of the CAPL form. But a definition of “insolvency” is preferable, and should be added by the drafting committee.
157 CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 2.3B. Clause 5.05 provides for interest, suspension from the venture, and ultimate removal of a defaulting non-operator.
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The UKOOA 2009 JOA has a similar provision, but the percentage of
ownership necessary to replace an operator is negotiated.158 The AIPN
2012 JOA straightforwardly provides an optional provision that an
Operator may be removed at any time without cause by the affirmative vote of
________ (______) or more of the total number of Non-Operators, excluding
Affiliates of the Operator, holding at least ________ percent (______%) of the
combined Participating Interest of such Non-Operators.159

The 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA and the 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA permit
operator removal when the operator no longer owns the largest interest.
If the Operator assigns part of its Working Interest (excluding an interest assigned
to an Affiliate) and the assignment reduces the Operator’s Working Interest to
less than the Working Interest of a Non‑Operating Party, whether accomplished
by one or more assignments, then the removal of the Operator requires approval
by Vote.160

The removal-without-cause option is rarely chosen in international
operations because host-government agreements commonly require government approval for a change of operator,161 and often the operator is the
only investor party to the host-government contract to have experience,
personnel, and equipment in the country. But removal without cause has
a place in domestic operations, where mineral-owner-approval requirements are unusual and operational logistics are easier. An optional provision for operator removal without cause should be included in the AAPL
Form 610 revision for the same reasons that it is included in the AIPN 2012
JOA. First, it is logical: “if one can intellectually conclude, or make the leap
of faith, that an Operator should be working for the benefit of all of the coadventurers, why should the Non-Operators not have the power to remove
their Operator?”162 Second, where chosen, the possibility of removal of
the operator without cause will help establish a cooperative relationship
between operator and non-operators: “the authority to remove will tend to
restrain the Operator from becoming too creative in charging its internal
costs, and will tend to cause the Operator to be attentive to the balance of
its wants and needs with those of the Non-Operators.”163 The mere pres158 UKOOA
159 AIPN

2009 JOA, at cl. 5.3.1(b).

2012 JOA, at art. 4.10.E.

160 2007 AAPL Deepwater JOA, at art. 4.4.1. See also 2002 AAPL Offshore JOA, at art.
4.4(c).
161 See Ernest E. Smith et al., International Petroleum Transactions 615 (Rocky Mt. Min.
L. Fdn. 3d ed. 2010). Investors rarely want to rock the investment boat by asking for government approval of an operator change.
162 Derman
163 Id.

& Barnes, supra note 98, at 4-39.
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ence of the option in the model form may help set a healthier tone for the
relationship of operator and non-operator.
Additionally, providing the non-operators with an option to remove
an operator whose interest falls below an agreed percentage of the whole
makes good sense; it is in every participant’s interest that the operator has
“skin in the game.”164

[c] Provide Options to Facilitate Renegotiation of
the Operating Agreement
There are several practical problems with the remedy of operator removal.
One is that it is often not feasible for the non-operators to take over operations or to locate a competent contract operator; change of operator is
likely to be an expensive process, particularly if it is done with short notice
and in the midst of disagreements. Second, because oil and gas exploration
and development is risky as well as expensive, the working interest owners
share an interest in continuity in operations with the operator; change may
bring mistakes and raise costs for everyone. And third, as discussed above,
an operator removed for cause often will dispute the existence of cause and
simply refuse to go, throwing the issue into the courts.
In this context, the drafting committee should also consider provisions
that might facilitate adjustment of operations short of operator removal,
by permitting renegotiation of provisions of the operating agreement that
may strain relations between the operator and the non-operators. Oil and
gas production may last for decades, and there is a strong possibility that
within that time there will be changes in company ownership, culture,
operating circumstances, or economics that will make the parties’ original
agreement unsatisfactory to at least some of the parties.
There are two provisions in the CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure that
are particularly attractive in that they permit adjustment of the terms of
the operating agreement and, potentially, a change of operator. The first is
the operator-challenge process, which permits a non-operator to replace
an operator in situations in which the terms the parties have agreed upon
turn out to be unattractive to the non-operators. The CAPL 2007 Operating Procedure provides that:
A.	
Challenge Notice-At any time after a Party has been the Operator for a continuous period of at least 2 years, any Non-Operator may give notice (the
“Challenge Notice”) to the other Parties that it is prepared to conduct Joint
Operations on more favourable terms and conditions. It will include in the
Challenge Notice sufficient detail to enable the other Parties to evaluate
the nature of the Challenge Notice and the effect the revised terms and
conditions would have on Joint Operations. Within 60 days after receipt of
164 See

supra note 28.
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the Challenge Notice, the Operator will notify the Parties if it is prepared to
operate on the terms and conditions set out therein. If it is, it will promptly
proceed to do so, and Subclause 2.03B [dealing with removal for cause] will
apply to it, mutatis mutandis. If it is not, it will resign as Operator effective
not later than 45 days after that 60 day period. The Operator will be deemed
to resign if it fails to deliver such a notice within that 60 day period.
B.	
Successor Operates Under Challenge Notice-If the Operator resigns under
Subclause 2.03A, a successor will be appointed under Clause 2.06, provided
that the Party that served the Challenge Notice will become the new Operator if no other Party is prepared to operate on the terms and conditions set
out herein. The new Operator will conduct Joint Operations on the basis set
forth in the Challenge Notice. Any costs in excess of those set out therein in
the 2 year period after becoming the Operator will be for its sole account.
Notwithstanding Clause 2.04 (but subject to Clause 2.09), the new Operator
may not resign until it has acted as Operator for at least 2 years.165

In other words, a non-operator that successfully challenges an operator
must “put up or pay up”; it is responsible for all excessive costs for the next
two years.
The second provision, a counterbalance to the operator-challenge provision, permits the operator to request modification of the terms and conditions of the operating procedure to its advantage and to the disadvantage
of the non-operators:
A Party that has been the Operator for a continuous period of 2 years may give
notice (“Operator’s Notice”) to the NonOperators of the revised terms and conditions on which it would continue as Operator, provided that an Operator operating under a previous Operator’s Notice may not serve another Operator’s Notice
until the previous one has been effective for at least 2 years. Within 60 days after
receipt of the Operator’s Notice, each Non-Operator will notify the Operator if
it agrees to the Operator operating under those revised terms and conditions. A
Non-Operator that fails to respond within that period will be deemed to agree to
those revised terms and conditions. A Non-Operator that does not agree must
give notice (“CounterProposal”) to the other Parties of the terms and conditions
upon which it would serve as the Operator. Any such CounterProposal will be
deemed to be a challenge of the Operator. Clause 2.03 will apply, mutatis mutandis, as if it were a Challenge Notice, except that the Counter-Proposal will be
compared to the terms and conditions proposed in the Operator’s Notice. If no
Party serves a Counter-Proposal, the Operator will thereafter operate under the
Operator’s Notice, with any excess costs for its sole account. Notwithstanding
Clause 2.04 (but subject to Clause 2.09), it may not resign until it has operated for
at least 2 years under any Operator’s Notice that becomes effective.166

Taken together, these two provisions are similar to the “Push/Pull” provisions sometimes found in partnership agreements, or “baseball arbitration.”
A fair criticism of these provisions is that they are unlikely to be helpful to non-operators with small interests. But the reality is that it is large
165 CAPL
166 Id.

2007 Operating Procedure, at cl. 2.4.

at cl. 2.5.
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interest owners that are likely to be operators, and to implement the provisions. The parties to any contract can always renegotiate that contract,
but making renegotiation a contract right brings a salutary certainty to the
process.

§ 27.04 Conclusion
The analysis above teaches several lessons. One is that the structure of
model form operating agreements around the world is surprisingly uniform. That should not be surprising, for though local law and culture may
require tweaks in the details, the purposes of an operating agreement and
the problems investors confront finding and producing oil and gas are much
the same wherever exploration and production occur. A second lesson is
that AAPL’s onshore model forms are “dated”; they have been overtaken by
both precedents and changes in technology and business structures.167 It is
high time to consider changes.168 And third, the analysis shows that some
of the newer model forms, in particular, contain useful ideas—and even
more importantly, language to implement them—that might be embraced
by AAPL’s drafting committee. It may be true that there is “nothing new
under the sun” when it comes to the structure and drafting of operating
agreements.169 But we can learn from what others have done, and the comparative analysis above demonstrates vividly that different words or word
structures may make a difference in meaning.
Operating agreements, like leases and deeds, are instruments of private
law. While the words parties choose to express their intent will always
be subject to interpretation in the context of the circumstances of the
agreement,170 there is no good reason for courts to intervene to rewrite

167 A thoughtful and incisive analysis of changes in the business structure caused by the
development of unconventional resources is found at David H. Sweeney et al., “Fracturing Relationships—The Impact of Risk and Risk Allocation on Unconventional Oil & Gas
Projects,” 65 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. 6-1 (Ctr. for Am. & Int’l L. 2014).
168 There are many “recurring issues” in operating agreements. As I noted in my presentation at the Annual Institute, I began this chapter thinking I could review a long list,
quickly cut it to five, and end by writing about just two, due to time and space constraints.
169 Ecclesiastes 1:4-11. For example, the operator-challenge provisions from the CAPL
model form that I discussed favorably in the last section were called “ ‘challenge’ or ‘flipflop’ clauses” by Joe Young when he wrote more than 40 years ago. Young, supra note 9, at
219.
170 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Theory of Legal Interpretation,” 12 Harv. L. Rev.
417, 417–18 (1899).
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the agreements of the parties.171 The challenge for the model form drafters, then, is to understand clearly what effects they seek to attain, and
then to pick words that clearly express those results. That is particularly
true of committee-drafted contracts, which may lack the focus of drafters
negotiating head-to-head, and an important reason to consider including
alternative provisions as options; let the parties make the final decisions.

171 This is a common theme in oil and gas jurisprudence. See Heritage Res., Inc. v.
NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 131 (Tex. 1996) (an important case involving interpretation
of a lease royalty clause) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1981);
Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. 1968)). See also Foster v. Atl. Ref.
Co., 329 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 1964).

